Hermeneutics

The present debates about the doctrine of God are, of course, not limited to that doctrine. There are several areas in play. One of those is obviously theological method, and another related one is the role of philosophy in competent theology. Not unexpectedly, because theology that is Scriptural is interpretation, a third is hermeneutics. That is why Craig Carter set out to write a book about classic theism in Nicene Trinitarian formulation and instead found he had to write about hermeneutics first.

The ground that is shifting in hermeneutics is moving away from an approach that controls for objectivity, reducing the interpretation to a single authorial intent, smuggling the rest that Christians have in the past retrieved in terms of meaning into the various applications. It is, of course, an epistemological shift as well. What can we know, you might ask, when we interpret? What are the objects of knowledge Scripture presents us with? The mind of God, is the answer.

That last is Christian Platonism. I am afraid that is how people with whom I talk think, and it is largely due to ignorance of John Eriugena who would have told you that the objects of knowledge are not in the mind of God, they are in the image of God. How long before Eriugena appears on people’s radars? I have read a description of him as the greatest Christian metaphysician ever, you know. Will Christian Platonism mean that you should know your Eriugena? That would be a pleasant expansion on the Carolingean pause in Medieval Church on the way to the tenth century and Anselm.

Anyway, the answer that I now see being provided, curiously enough, is a return to the quadriga: the literal, the allegorical, the analogical, and the tropological. The hermeneutics of redemptive-historical preaching are allegorical hermeneutics, the difference is that since people today think allegory means irresponsibly imaginative interpretation, the term is avoided and Origen smeared. Which is silly. Origen was often incorrect, but he was seldom irresponsible. (That is a failure of church historians. I think a recovery of the Great Traditions, as Carter advocates, is going to involve speaking more accurately, more honestly in terms of how we present the past.) The Analogical is when we ask how does this passage help me orient my Christian life in terms of the life to come. Hardly something we can afford to suppress (2 Pet 3:11). And the tropological meaning is when you ask about present conduct: Christian morality, ethics, and such matters, which Scripture clearly addresses.

The return to a fourfold interpretation is first to recognize at least a twofold: human and divine. Can God have meant more than the human author intended? That is a question getting an affirmative. Is Scripture a book like other books? Negative. And the whole thing is not really that controversial, if what has been developing can be connected to the right terminology.

On the surface at least, much of what creates the confusion and controversy is a combination of bad historiography and careless terminology. Below the surface has been a whig approach to history (or a protestant triumphalist narrative) in which what we have gained is so prized that we are not reluctant to sever our connections altogether or dangle by the thinnest of implausible threads.

Plato and the Body

“If human existence sans bodies is better, could you blog about why God made us with bodies and why we will be raised with them?”

The question was posed to me on twitter. The request was to answer on my blog.

I’m happy to blog.

Have I said human existence without bodies is better? I do not remember having done so. I am looking forward to the resurrection because I’ll have a better body. Let me also say, I prefer Plato and I think he is defensible. But I’ll abandon Plato if it can be demonstrated that he is incompatible with Christianity. I defend Plato, also, because I think he is ignorantly dismissed. You can be very learned and ignorantly dismiss Plato. Plato is not easily dealt with.

The assumption, I am guessing, is that because I’m a Platonist I believe existence without bodies is better. For the pagan Platonist, the body is a prison. Even for Origen, the body was a punishment. But Origen was disciplined by Scripture, and this changed his Platonism; a punishment is not the same as a prison. I got the sense reading him that 1 Cor 15 was a very important passage for him. He believed in the resurrection very much, and thought hard about how the body of the resurrection differs from the perishable body that is sown. Just there we can see a development of Platonism, and that is an important thing to remember.

Some persons who are not sympathetic to Platonism, or ignorant of it, find it convenient to take a view that allows for no development. This is what they think Plato said (which may or may not be right), and this, then, must be what Platonism actually is. Is there more than a superficial acquaintance with the more popular and less technical of Plato’s writings? I have often not found that there is not. If Platonism is allowed to be Platonic, however, it is an idea, it is formal, it is a principle of intelligible coherence which can be grasped more clearly as we learn more about it. If you are not a Platonist, you may not believe that about Platonism. It is just a concept, you may think, that Plato invented. But a Platonist must be allowed to believe it is something independent of Plato to which we can have better access than Plato did. It can be seen more clearly, apprehended better, since it is, after all, an object of knowledge. We must be allowed to believe that Platonism is the Form of philosophy (as I suppose Hegelians believe Hegel’s is philosophy come of age).

If Platonism may develop (that is, if our apprehension of a better philosophy may proceed on the assumption that Plato first discovered the broad outlines of what we hold), then pagan Platonism may be corrected by Christian Platonism, and Christian Platonism become more robust and consistent. I believe Platonism is true, and so I think the Christian appropriation leaves us with a better Platonism than Plato held. Did Aristotle get things right? Is he valuable? Of course. But Plato is fundamental in a way Aristotle can never be. Do I believe in the transmigration of the soul? I do not. I do believe I’ll transmigrate from this old body into one that is better, and therefore different. I’ll take Aquinas’ description of the resurrected body, for example. I find it eminently Platonic. That is not the same as the reincarnation which Plato believed.

Platonism and Gnosticism

Another thing to consider about the conditional above, is that unexamined views of Platonism tend to get distorted by views on Gnosticism. It is assumed that Gnosticism is Christianity ruined by Platonic thought. If you think that, then you get a debased view of Platonism. Let me counter that view with three names: Irenaeus, Origen and Plotinus.

When the church needed champions to take on Gnosticism and defeat it, who did it call on? The most obvious name is Irenaeus. According to Eric Osborne, a qualified and respected historian of the early church, Irenaeus was a Platonist. That is how Osborne characterizes Irenaeus in his monograph on the same. So who did the church call on to write a manual in tedious detail listing all the many wrong teachings of this variegated phenomenon later designated as Gnosticism? A man whose philosophy is clearly identifiable as Platonic. It was not a bad move. Irenaeus is still our main source and the main argument against Gnosticism.

The other person the church called on repeatedly was Origen. Origen traveled to debates against Gnostics, was valued for refuting them, and probably knew them very well. I say this because he lived in the epicenter of the more reputable Gnosticism, Alexandria, and even went to some of their secret meetings when he was young. Was Origen a Platonist? There is little doubt on that score. Platonism sometimes overwhelmed his Christianity. No Christian of his day would have called him a gnostic though (except for Clement who also resisted the Gnostics and called himself the true gnostic). Yet he was called on to debate Gnostics and refute them. He understood and repudiated them without, obviously, repudiating Plato.

These two are the main champions of the church against Gnosticism that I know of, and both can accurately be described as Platonists. The problem with Gnostics is not that they used Plato. It is that they got two things wrong: Plato and Christianity. Nobody orthodox will deny they fiddled and took liberties and distorted Christianity. We need to realize they were doing the same with Plato—a popularized, bowdlerized, irresponsible appropriation of some Platonic elements.

After Plato, the next greatest pagan Platonist was Plotinus. He had some Gnostic students attending his teaching sessions in Rome. The way Plotinus taught, we are told by his pupil Porphyry, was this. His students would read a portion of some philosopher (Aristotle say, or Numenius) and then discuss the philosophy. Or they would present papers about things. There would be a discussion which Plotinus would observe, mostly in silence. After a few days, when the discussion was winding down, Plotinus would pronounce himself. Porphyry encouraged him to write these pronunciations down, which Plotinus did. One of them was a treatise against Gnosticism. The Platonic Plotinus was decidedly against Gnosticism, and if his manner of teaching is accurately described by his pupil, then he no doubt had some familiarity with the Gnosticism his students embraced. He hated it.

Plotinus criticized Gnosticism on three points. (1) It was disordered in its metaphysics. For Plotinus there is the One, there is Mind, there is World Soul, and that is all. This was a reasoned and for Plotinus non-negotiable metaphysical structure. It made sense of the forms, it provided a Divine Simplicity, it mediated eternity to the world. He has whole treatises that argue cogently for his structure. The Gnostics had a chaos of inelegant and, what is worse, unreasoned emanations. Plotinus hated the lack of philosophically sophisticated dogma about the structure of reality. I think it made these students gawking adherents rather than real intellectual companions, for Plotinus. Hard to be an intellectual companion to Plotinus, but he was a serious guy and I think expected much of his pupils. (2) He also rejected Gnostic teaching on the ground that it despised the physical world, the created order. This is something people nowadays struggle with. To believe something is inferior is not to believe it is evil. I just read in an otherwise reputable history book something implying that people in the past were misogynists because they believed women were inferior. Some people in the past obviously have made the mistake people in the present make: inferior = bad. Inferior, however, can be morally neutral. A dog is inferior to me, but not therefore a mistake or somehow evil. Gnosticism believed the created order was evil, but Plotinus was shocked by such a non-Hellenic attitude. The world was good, its order was marvelous and intriguing, and it was all because this beauty was derived from, and therefore manifested, a greater transcendent order: that of the forms. That it was derived made it inferior, but not therefore bad. Everything turning toward the forms and participating in them aspired toward them, toward the Good, and this is good. (3) Plotinus also rejected the Gnostics for their irreverence: they made things up, they were incoherent, they ascribed too much to personal creativity without rigorous examination and thought. I think when it comes to defining the variegated phenomenon of Gnosticism, attitude is what really defines them, not dogma. They were the manifestation of a pagan attitude in a Christian context. Not only was Christianity at war with the pagan attitude and its irreverence, Hellenic philosophy was its other historic nemesis and one of the great causes weakening the totalitarian pagan consensus which was collapsing in late antiquity.

If that surprises you, go read his treatise and you’ll see what I say. Plotinus is tough to read, I’ll warn you. I tried and was unable to make sense of him without first reading a few very difficult introductions. But once you get what is happening, he is admirable and amazing. The rigor he expected he practiced, and he wrote his treatises all at one go without revision because of his weak eyesight. His weak physical eyesight, I should say. The mind of Plotinus is wondrous. What he writes against the Gnostics should put to rest the notion that Gnosticism made responsible use of Platonism. Neither in the church nor in philosophy did Gnosticism find acceptance. To think of Platonism through the lens of Gnosticism is to be irresponsible about a serious philosophy, and ignorant.

Which is all to say: do not assume unexamined conclusions about Platonism in order to deal with it.

What is the Body?

Now to the heart of the matter. What about Platonism and the creation of man as an embodied soul. That the body is a prison is not altogether true, but I don’t think it has for the Christian to be altogether false. Platonism is first of all an epistemology, and then it is everything that follows from that. If you do not understand that, you do not understand Plato. Plato was first concerned with certain knowledge. What can we know? Can we know this mutable world? No, you can’t know something that is always changing. So if we know, there has to be a realm of certainty, an immutable world. Is this consistent with Christian teaching? Yes it is. There is a realm of certainty; there is truth; we can know; and it is an invisible realm. The visible realm manifests it, but is not identified with it. The relation is of symbol to the meaning of a symbol.

Our body is a symbol. That is not to say it is unreal, but what it is derives what it is from something greater. I don’t know how you can be a Platonist and escape from language of levels of being. Is the created world real? Of course. Is there a higher reality? Oh yes, and one, therefore, more real. If you look for ultimate reality in the material order you will go crazy. It is beyond it. So we have material bodies, but matter only acquires anything by form. Is there a form of Body? There must be, and that is true bodiness. My body is me in a derivative way. It gets my meness from what I am essentially: my immaterial part. It is me in the mutable realm, but when I am resurrected will my body be corruptible or incorruptible? Is this a more material body? A more substantial one? (It has to be at least as substantial.) Is it made of superior matter? I am not sure. I am sure it will be incorruptible, and the Platonic epistemology leads me to conclude that this present matter is not incorruptible.

Angels do not have physical bodies, we believe. They have bodies though, just not made out of physical matter. Some might say it is a subtler substance. What is this? I am not sure how you can have subtler atoms. Do they use subatomic particles exclusively, and not in compounds that we know as atoms and molecules? I think that kind of thinking is just barking up the wrong tree. They are spiritual beings with bodies that are constituted by a higher reality, not a differently physical reality, but that is a preference making me say that. What, after all, can a higher reality be? Not sure, though I am sure it exists. C. S. Lewis suggests it two ways: one in The Great Divorce (a hardness that makes our present hardness looks like softness, or a substance that makes our present substance seem more insubstantial) and another in The Last Battle (I like this one, and not just because he acknowledges Plato as the source: all the best parts are present in greater abundance and nothing else). We can only speak of it in terms of what we presently know. We can only gesture at what we haven’t yet experienced. Just because we can’t imagine something clearly, doesn’t mean it is not within the realm of possibility.

Which is to say: I affirm the resurrection of the body. I conceive of it in Platonic terms in so far as I can. I do refuse to think of it as a slightly enhanced but essentially similar state to the present condition. I’d like more. I realize that is what makes me weird, but the alternative to me is to be flat-footed, uninteresting, plodding and dingy of both mind and heart. Still, if Platonism can be demonstrated to deny that (which an intelligent Platonism to date has not been demonstrated to require), then cheerio to Platonism. I’m doubtful, having understood Christian history to be full of Christian Platonists who were powerful, consistent, penetrating thinkers, that my Christian Platonism is under any real threat. I have found that even attacks from learned people are based on ignorance.

So Why the Body to Begin with?

We are lower beings than angels. Inferior, but not therefore evil. Good, after our kind, like dogs are good after their kind. One day, however, we shall judge the angels, and I think that is because we will be greater than them. We will transcend their order of being because unlike them we have been made to grow. Growth, mutability, change—do these belong to all finite beings or to some? You can be made to occupy your place forever: not bored, not weary, perfectly capable for you responsibility and endlessly satisfied with it. I do not think that is how we are. I think we are made to grow, and this requires the material where all is change. So we must begin there, become conscious there, almost like animals, as we are when we are young. If Angels grow, we do not know about it, but I think to grow you have to start out how we do, in matter which is the most mutable. But we do not remain there. And we will have incorruptible bodies.

John Eriugena was the greatest Christian Platonist ever. In his book on the divisions of nature he begins with the division that gives us nature: God on the one hand, and everything that is not God on the other. Everything that is not God is nature. What is the principle of coherence of nature? That which is not God is image of God. And what is the image of God? Man. Man is like Plotinus’ Nous in Eriugena’s scheme. Is that not grand? I think it is. Do you know how much room to grow that provides creatures who begin in the epitome that is practically an infinity of finiteness?

 

 

Wonder and Interpretation

There is a careless use of the word ‘allegorical’ to mean ‘irresponsible’. The insinuation is that allegorical interpretation is that which generates meaning without control. Since Origen is associated with allegorical hermeneutics, he is therefore dismissed as the father of irresponsible interpretation. That he was condemned in a subsequent century does not help.

Were you to believe this account of Origen, however, you would be wrong. Origen believed the Scriptures were an incarnation of Christ, and what he was seeking was spiritual profit. Origen was dismissive of the literal meaning. This is not the same as despising it, which he did not. He believed the literal meaning of Scripture—the reading of it aloud to another person—was profitable. It was the somatic use (the body) and profitable for young Christians. But he believed the Bible existed for greater purposes.

In his homilies Origen did at least two things: he wanted to use the Scripture to bring Christians to maturity, and so he had a tropological (moral and ethical) emphasis. He called it the psychic (the soul) use of Scripture. He believed that in order to advance in the Christian life you had to learn Christian disciplines and Christian behavior. You will find a lot of this in his homilies; it has to do with the audience he addressed. He believed the bulk of his audience was not that spiritually advanced. As a result, he did not want to present deeper spiritual meaning as much as he wanted to get them to the place where they could handle it. This idea, that you have to advance in the Christian life before you can handle some things (which at present is not usually compelling) is not a minority view in past ages of Christianity.

The second thing Origen did in his homilies, and apparently the main thing he did in his commentaries, was to entice Christians into deeper understanding. This is the pneumatic (the spirit) use of Scripture; it is the allegorical interpretation. Let me put it this way: when the blind man cries after the Savior, “Son of David, have mercy on me,” what is actually happening? Is this simply a story about a blind man who receives physical sight? If that is all you preach, then you should quit right now. It is an allegory, a figure, of the soul and Christ. It is both a figure of the lost human being who seeks from Jesus Christ salvation, and it is a picture of the believer under the dominion of sin who cries out to the only one powerful enough to break that dominion and to make him a cheerful and useful servant. It is not irresponsible to find in the stories of Scripture instruction on the spiritual life; it is their point.

The problem is still how you control interpretation. You cannot use Scripture to say anything at all. But I think it would have been curious to Origen to observe the modern tendency to make the Scripture say less rather than more. Part of this is that what he was doing, so new and fresh and full of possibility at the time (his writings filled the ancient world, instructed the best expositors and theologians, and it is now believed that his hermeneutics undergird the theological conclusions for which the theological world wars of the fourth and fifth centuries were fought; no kidding—not quite that simple, but nevertheless generally true, just study the protagonists of the Trinitarian and Christological controversies). We are exposed early on to the excess and abuse, and are taught to think of allegory on those terms.

But for Origen Scripture was a book of wonders, and in this I think he is more right than many I hear today. Scripture, as some use it, is not a book of wonders, but rather one which in every way the meaning ought to be compressed, reduced to the smallest possible wafer width. But that is the way of incoherence. One of the things Origen got wrong is that he was rather dismissive of the ordinary. It is more understandable that he should have that fault than that we should be dismissive of wonder and prize the ordinary more. He did what he did with the letter of Scripture because he wanted to move on to the wonder. But why do we want to move away from that, to reduce and to tame Scripture?

Yes, the point is accuracy, but accuracy that is not circumscribed by the wrong criteria. Scripture contains the ordinary, and goes beyond it to the extraordinary, and we begin with one because we seek the other. When it comes to a supernatural book with divine meaning and spiritual purposes, is not wonder to be expected? It is to be desired with a great desire.

Origen took the Platonic attitude of wonder and addressed himself to the study of Scripture that way. We can see that in the preparation he made of students: it was according to the most rigorously philosophical approaches of the day. It was a kind of athletic training, in which today you have disciplined rest, nourishment, exercise, in order to have a peak performance. He did the trivium and the quadrivium. And with this rigorous preparation, as if they were astronauts, he then had his students plunge into the depths of Scripture in arduous long journeys looking for the wonder, advancing through the psychic to the pneumatic use in order to understand in that trichotonomic image—body, soul and spirit—the incarnation of Christ the Word.

Incarnation is the paradoxical apotheosis of wonder, remember, and it is no wonder Origen thought of Scripture as a kind of incarnation. He thought of it as a marvel and a wonder, and he taught the Early Church how to do so, how to approach it as such. In the nick of time too, since a preparation for wonder was exactly what the Trinitarian and Christological controversies required.

Fitting, Noble, and Necessary

In this way, therefore, I think the marriages of the elders are interpreted more fittingly; in this way the unions entered by the patriarchs in their now final and weakened age are understood more nobly; in this way I hold the necessary begetting of children should be reckoned.

-Origen, Homilies on Genesis 11.2

What Origen is talking about is the fact that when the patriarchs practice polygamy, many, and even careless interpreters in our day, think it is amounts to the endorsement of a vice. But, says Origen, when a person practices a virtue, when someone for example is habituated to hospitality, he can be said to take it to wife. Is it any wonder, then, that we’re told, specially when they were older, that the patriarchs had many?

Do you see what he’s done? Origen has taken what might be taken as the presence of a vice and said, “No, it is in fact the opposite. In this way, therefore, I think the marriages of the elders are interpreted more fittingly; in this way the unions entered by the patriarchs in their now final and weakened age are understood more nobly; in this way I hold the necessary begetting of children should be reckoned.”

Here is the question, though: how is this plausible? When I was being trained by dispensationalists I was taught that a proper method was to interpret the obscure in light of the obscure. And, I was told, you’ll have to end up a premillennialist. When I started attending a Reformed church, a Sunday school was done dealing with the various millennial views, the conclusions being amillennialist. What was the method stressed? The obscure have to be interpreted in light of the clear. In fact, the same method, as to that point. And both parties gave me to understand that the correct method was the key.

But the correct method is not the key, as Augustine, who gave it second priority, knew. What is key is determining what is obscure and what is clear, or rather, just determining what is clear. Augustine has a solution for this. It is the telos, the purpose of Scripture, and I think he is right. This is more important than method, so much so for Augustine that you can use the wrong method to get to the right conclusion.

In Origen’s case—for the purposes of understanding him—it is, I think, something Aristotle can shed light on. In chapter 9 of the Poetics, Aristotle famously writes that poetry “is more philosophical and more serious than history: in fact poetry speaks more of universals, whereas history of particulars.” The detail of history, the narrative surface of the text, was not where clarity should be located for Origen. Rather, clarity is located in the purposes of God: Christ and the church, Christ and the believer, invisible things that are held by faith. The allegorical meaning, the spiritual realities which we clearly apprehend thanks to the Rule of Faith and universal Christian practice point us toward the purposes.

Of course, Origen will adduce texts to substantiate his views: in his mind clear texts. It is interesting how much the clarity of these is apparent in his situation though, how much his method is determined by three groups interpreting Scripture he had to deal with. Naïve believers were one of these groups, and he is constantly exhorting them to look deeper, to advance in piety (the journey toward God) so they can have more clarity of the real heart of Scripture. The second group was the Gnostics, which trafficked in incoherence. Platonism was only a source for Gnosticism in the way Scripture was: the Gnostics wrested both. Platonism in fact, in Plotinus, in fact, rejected Gnosticism decisively. So did Origen, promoting the spiritual coherence of Scripture, rather than its fragmentation and incoherence. For him the wonder of Scripture was not appetitive, but a matter of rightly ordered affections. The third group was the most influential on Origen: the Jews. The literal and anti-Christological reading they gave the Old Testament seems to be what most drove Origen. He kept up a steady polemic against Jewish interpretation as definitely incompatible with the purposes of God. The letter killeth, he would often repeat, but the Spirit maketh alive; and Aristotle helps us locate these things in the cosmos of his thinking.